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The Asset Quality Review and Capital Needs: 
Why re-capitalise banks with public money? 
Daniel Gros 
No. 311, 19 December 2013 
It is generally assumed that any capital needs discovered by the Asset Quality Review the ECB is scheduled to 
finish by the end of 2014 should be filled by public funding (= fiscal backstop). This assumption is wrong, 
however.  Banks  that  do  not  have  enough  capital  should  be  asked  to  obtain  it  from  the  market;  or  be 
restructured using the procedures and rules recently agreed. The Directorate-General for Competition at the 
European Commission should be particularly vigilant to ensure that no further state aid flows to an already 
oversized European banking system. 
The case for a public backstop was strong when the entire euro area banking system was under stress, but this 
is no longer the case. Banks with a viable business model can find capital; those without should be closed 
because any public-sector re-capitalisation would likely mean throwing good money after bad. 
Executive Summary 
here  are  three  aggregate  numbers  that 
describe  the  problem  the  Single 
Supervisory  Mechanism  (SSM)  is 
inheriting:  the  130  banks  under  its  direct 
supervision hold assets worth 250% of the euro 
area’s  GDP,  their  capital  is  equivalent  to  only 
4%  of  their  assets’  value  and  they  have  made 
zero profits, in the aggregate, over the last four 
years.  
This  is  clearly  not  a  ‘normal’  sector  of  the 
economy.  Of  course,  the  aggregate  numbers 
hide huge national and sectoral differences, but 
aggregate  numbers  do  have  some  immediate 
implications. 
The  huge  amount  of  assets  implies  that  any 
problem  with  their  value  could  raise  massive 
risk, which could materialise quickly in losses, 
very large both relative to the bank’s capital and 
relative to GDP. The cases of Spain and Ireland 
show what can happen if large banking systems 
make large losses. 
 
Furthermore, given that these banks, which are 
coming under the Asset Quality Review (AQR), 
hold already about €1,000 billion in capital, any 
substantial  re-capitalisation  of  the  sector 
requires  funds  in  the  order  of  hundreds  of 
billions of euro. 
But  the  aim  of  the  AQR  is  not  to  change  the 
status  quo  of  a  large  and  thinly  capitalised 
banking  system,  but  only  to  uncover  whether 
some  banks  have  overvalued  assets  on  their 
balance sheets. 
Any  re-capitalisation  needs  that  the  AQR 
uncovers could be covered by the market, which 
can discriminate better between banks that are 
viable  in  the  long  run  and  those  that  are  not. 
Those  banks  unable  to  obtain  market  funding 
should  be  restructured  gradually  under  the 
rules recently agreed.  
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The continuing tendency of national authorities 
to  help  their  banks  is  evident  from  the  recent 
decision of the Spanish authorities to allow their 
banks  to  recognise  ‘deferred  tax  assets’  as 
capital.  The  revaluation  of  the  share  of  Italian 
banks  held  in  the  National  Central  Bank  also 
increases the regulatory capital of some Italian 
banks (albeit by a rather small amount). In both 
cases  the  motives  of  the  national  authorities 
might  have  been  understandable  and  both 
measures have been made fully compatible with 
EU  norms.  But  both  episodes  show  the 
continuing  influence  of  national  authorities  on 
bank capitalisation. 
Introduction 
When  the  Heads  of  State  and  Government 
agreed in principle on the creation of a Banking 
Union in the summer of 2012, the one step that 
was  immediately  agreed  and  quickly 
implemented was the decision to give the ECB 
supervisory  powers.  The  main  reason  for  this 
was that it had become clear during the crisis 
that  national  supervisors  had  become 
champions  of  their  own  banks.  National 
supervisors had not always recognised serious 
problems  at  home  and  had  developed  a 
tendency to ring-fence assets of ‘their’ banks (i.e. 
banks headquartered or even only with a legal 
seat in their countries). 
The  first  phenomenon  had  created  the 
widespread impression that the balance sheets 
of the major banks which now come under the 
direct  supervision  of  the  ECB  might  harbour 
significant amounts of assets that might not be 
properly valued. It was thus natural to allow the 
ECB to conduct its own ‘Asset Quality Review’ 
(AQR)  to  make  sure  that  the  banks  it  is  now 
directly supervising are properly capitalised.  
It is widely expected that the AQR, which the 
ECB  will  be  conducting  in  the  course  of  2014 
will  uncover  the  need  to  re-capitalise  some 
banks.  This  had  led  to  much  discussion 
concerning  the  potential  magnitude  of  the 
capital shortfall and the sources of funds for the 
re-capitalisation  of  those  banks  in  need  of 
additional  capital.  This  contribution  will  deal 
only with the latter aspect. 
The  evaluation  of  the  capital  needs  of  a  bank 
cannot be done only on the basis of a review of 
the quality of its assets. In the long run, a bank 
can  only  survive  if  it  has  a  viable  business 
model. A forthcoming CEPS publication will go 
in great detail in the different business models 
pursued by the many different types of banks 
that operate in the 28 member countries of the 
EU. (Every sector and every national supervisor 
argues  naturally  that  its  sector  or  its  banking 
system is totally safe and that the real problems 
are elsewhere.) But the broader issues raised by 
the  diversity  within  the  European  banking 
sector  cannot  be  addressed  in  this  short 
contribution. 
1.  Asset Quality Review versus 
business model review 
The  name  ‘Asset  Quality  Review’  suggests  a 
simple  underlying  problem:  some  assets  are 
overvalued on the balance sheets of the banks. 
The  ECB  will  organise  a  proper  evaluation  of 
the  value  of  all  assets  in  the  banks’  balance 
sheets and if it estimates that the ‘true’ value of 
some assets is lower than what provided in the 
book,  the  bank  in  question  will  be  asked  to 
increase  its  capital  in  order  to  cover  these 
accounting losses. That seems to be the end of 
the story. 
In reality, however, the problem is often much 
more severe. Indeed, one should also consider 
that  on  average  the  banks  under  review  have 
not made any profits over the last years. Many 
banks might not only have overvalued assets on 
their  balance  sheets,  but  they  might  also  lose 
money on their current operations. If this is the 
case, the problem can no longer be cured by a 
once-off injection of capital, but only by a deep 
restructuring  of  the  bank  itself.  Moreover,  it 
simply does not make sense to put new capital 
into  banks  which  for  the  foreseeable  future 
cannot return (operating) profits. 
Gros (2013) has shown that there might be large 
parts of the euro area’s banking system which 
have  a  structural  profitability  problem.  The 
difficulties in southern Europe are well known, 
although  they  differ  fundamentally  from 
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Box 1. The overlapping circles of European banking 
The group of 130 banks subject to the direct supervision of the ECB (and now under the AQR) should not be 
seen in isolation, but in the context of a very complex structure with many overlapping circles as shown in 
Figure 1 given the many levels which concur in banking supervision and regulation in Europe. In ascending 
order of magnitude there is the euro area, the EU and the EEA. In terms of banks under special scrutiny, 
there is the group of 130 banks directly under the ECB and now subject to the AQR. Then there is the sample 
of 84 banks, which the EBA covers more closely. And finally there are, in Europe, 14 banks that are looked 
over by the Financial Stability Board (FSB) because they are of potential global significance, nine of which 
will also be under the direct supervision of the ECB. 
Figure 1. Banks and banking supervision and regulation 
 
Source: Ayadi & De Groen (2014). 
For example, the EBA will launch another of its periodic stress tests next year. Many of the about 90 banks 
that fall under the stress test of the EBA will also be tested by the ECB at the same time. As the figure shows, 
there are also over 50 banks coming under the EBA stress tests that do not fall under the AQR. If the EBA 
stress tests and the AQR (cum stress test) of the ECB are of similar quality, one must presume that there 
might be an additional need for re-capitalisation coming to light from the EBA stress test at the same time as 
the AQR.  
 
In  Spain  banks  have  over  the  years  issued 
hundreds  of  billions  of  30-year  mortgages 
whose  interest  rates  are  indexed  to  interbank 
rates (Euribor), with a small spread (often less 
than 100 basis points) fixed for the life time of 
the mortgage. This seemed profitable at a time 
when  Spanish  banks  were  able  to  refinance 
themselves  at  a  spread  much  lower  than  100 
basis points. But today Spanish banks, especially 
those  most  heavily  engaged  in  domestic 
mortgage lending have to pay much more than 
100 basis points spread over inter-bank rates on 
their own cost of funding. Many local Spanish 
banks  can  thus  stay  afloat  only  because  they 
refinance a large share of their mortgage book 
via the ECB. But reliance on cheap central bank 
(re)financing  does  not  represent  a  viable 
business model.  
German  banks  have  deposited  hundreds  of 
billions  of  excess  liquidity  at  the  ECB.  The 
quality of these assets is 100% (i.e. zero risk), but 
the  return  is  zero.  This  does  not  make  a 
profitable  business  model  since  the  funding 
costs  of  German  banks  are not  zero  given  the 
expensive domestic retail network necessary to 
collect  the  savings  deposits,  which  form 
backbone of their financing. DRAFT  DRAFT 
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There will of course be  wide variations across 
individual banks and sectors. But it is clear that 
in an environment of low growth, low interest 
rates  but  high  risk  premia  many  banks  must 
struggle to survive. 
On the one hand, instead of simply reviewing 
the quality of the assets of the banks under its 
direct supervision, the ECB should also review 
their  longer  terms  viability,  i.e.  their  business 
models. ECB representatives have said that they 
intend to look at the viability of business models 
as well. Yet, it remains to be seen whether they 
will  be  able  to  do  so  since  the  AQR  is 
undertaken  in  cooperation  with  the  national 
supervisors and no national authority is likely to 
admit that its national ‘champion’ does not have 
a viable long term business model.  
On the other hand, it should not be the task of a 
public  sector  institution  to  decide  which 
banking business models are viable. This should 
normally be done by the capital market. But the 
authorities  might  have  no  choice  if  the  bank 
itself  declares  that  it  is  not  able  to  raise  the 
capital the supervisors regards as necessary for 
financial stability. 
2.  Why use public capital for re-
capitalisation? 
Most  discussions  about  the  AQR  assume  as 
given that any re-capitalisation need should be 
taken up by public funds. In the next section, it 
is argued that this is not a proper assumption. 
2.1  On the ‘need’ for public sector re-
capitalisation  
From a theoretical point of view, if the market 
for  bank  capital  is  working  normally  there 
should  be  no  need  for  a  public  sector  re-
capitalisation.  
A  properly  working  market  for  bank  capital 
does not mean that capital is necessarily cheap 
(or expensive). On the contrary, given the dearth 
of  profits  in  the  sector,  it  is  quite  likely  that 
capital  would  be  very  costly;  i.e.  the  present 
owners might have to issue a lot of new shares 
to obtain new capital. Deciding about the price 
of  capital  for  any  sector  of  the  economy  is 
exactly what the capital markets are supposed to 
do – whether or not the present owners of the 
capital  like  this  verdict  or  not.  The  present 
owner will oppose any re-capitalisation exactly 
at the time when it is most needed because such 
need  is  likely  to  emerge  for  banks  with 
problems  and  hence  for  which  capital  will  be 
naturally very expensive (or equivalently where 
the market value of the bank is very low). Under 
these circumstances any re-capitalisation via the 
capital market will dilute the own control rights 
of  the  present  owners  (see  also  Bini  Smaghi, 
2013).  
The most visible expression of the scepticisms of 
investors  concerning  the  European  banking 
sector is the fact that (for the banks which are 
quoted) the market value is usually much lower 
than  the  book  value.  Before  the  crisis  the 
opposite was true: the market value was higher 
than the book value as investors then, ex post 
mistakenly,  believe  that  bank  profits  would 
increase forever.  
The  so  called  market/book  ratio  has  recently 
improved  considerably,  but  it  remains  in  the 
aggregate  significantly  below  one  (and  it  is  of 
course much lower for the problem banks which 
might be most in need of capital). 
The present owners of bank capital have thus a 
strong  incentive  to  argue  that  the  market  for 
bank capital is not working properly.  
Hence the question key question is: What is the 
evidence  that  the  market  for  bank  capital  is 
closed? 
Reliable  data  on  the  amounts  of  capital  banks 
are raising are scarce. Commercial information 
services provide statements like these:  
“...  analysts  at  information  provider  SNL 
Financial  estimate  that  European  lenders 
have raised a total of €415.6 billion of equity 
since  the  start  of  2009”  (as  reported  in 
Financial News, 16 October 2013). 
If  one  takes  these  estimates  as  correct  and 
spreads  the  €400  billion  over  four  and  a  half 
years  (since  2009),  about  €100  billion  per  year 
(including some crisis years) is being raised by 
banks. This would suggest that it should not be 
impossible  to  force  banks  to  raise  substantial 
amounts  directly  on  capital  markets  to  cover 
any shortfall the AQR might ascertain. THE ASSET QUALITY REVIEW AND CAPITAL NEEDS: WHY RE-CAPITALISE BANKS WITH PUBLIC MONEY? | 5 
 
 
The  ECB  provides  statistical  series  on  quoted 
shares issued by MFIs. This is a more restrictive 
definition  than  overall  equity  issuance  since  it 
includes  only  quoted  share  (and  many  of  the 
SSM  banks  are  not  quoted).  Under  this 
restrictive  definition  the  numbers  are 
considerably  smaller  and  more  variable  as 
Figure 2 below shows. According to the chart, at 
present, banks are issuing new quoted share at a 
rate of €40 billion per annum, but this does not 
seem  to  be  the  limit  that  the  market  can  bear 
given that issuance was already higher than 60 
billion  in  2011,  when  market  conditions  were 
much  less  favourable  than  today.  Given  that 
banks under review will have one year before 
the  AQR  delivers  its  outcome,  it  could  be 
possible  to  fill  capital  holes,  in  viable  banks, 
with private capital. 
Figure 2. Quoted shares issues, other financial institutions, cumulated over 12 months (€ billion) 
 
Source: Own elaboration on ECB data. 
All in all it thus appears that the need for public 
sector funding to backstop any capital needs the 
AQR might unearth is much exaggerated.  
It is often argued that the public sector backstop 
is crucial  for ‘confidence’. However, in reality, 
confidence  is  in  first  place  based  on 
fundamentals,  at  least  outside  panic  mood 
during acute crises. In this same line, the OECD 
publication  on  Euro  area  banks  indicates  that 
'Despite actions to strengthen banks and build a 
banking  union,  confidence  in  the  euro  area 
banking system remains week, and is likely to 
remain  so  until  underlying  concerns  over  low 
capitalisation of some banks are addressed.’1 
                                                   
1 See: OECD (2013). 
 
2.2  The real conundrum: Throw good 
money after bad? 
The  concrete  issue  facing  the  authorities  (not 
only the ECB, but also the Commission, and the 
national authorities) is what to do in case of a 
bank for which the market is really not willing 
to provide the necessary capital at any price. The 
qualifier at any price is crucial here because as 
long as there is a price at which  investors are 
willing to put fresh capital into an ailing bank 
there should be no need for public funding. It is 
of course possible that market failures occur and 
that the evaluation by the market of the value of 
any particular bank is mistaken. It might be too 
low (or too high), but this does not constitute a 
reason  to  help  present  owners  of  capital  to 
preserve their control by putting public funding 
into the bank. 
The  more  fundamental  issue  is  then  whether 
one could leave banks without a clear business 
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model (the ones with a clearly viable business 
model  will  not  have  problems  to  access  the 
market) to the market mechanism. 
This should be the case of most sectors of the 
economy,  but  for  banking.  A  bank  without  a 
viable business model does not shrink gradually 
and  then  disappears.  Its  share  price  might 
decline  towards  zero,  but  its  retail  customers 
will be blissfully unaware of the difficulties, and 
other  creditors  will  continue  to  provide 
financing because they expect that in the end the 
(national)  authorities  will  intervene  before  the 
bank  fails  by  either  providing  emergency 
funding or by arranging a merger with another 
institution.2  When  this  expectation  is  not 
fulfilled the complacency often turns into panic 
and  very  costly  bank  run  ensues.  The  process 
leading up to the bankruptcy of Lehman in the 
fall of 2008 showed this mechanism in action. 
This  is  indeed  the  rationale  behind  the  asset 
quality review but also for an assessment of the 
business model. Depositors would be aware of 
the  real  conditions  of  the  bank  and  creditors’ 
moral hazard would be eliminated.  
3.  Bank lending in the euro area: A 
question of quantity or quality? 
Keeping a weak banking system afloat has high 
economic  costs.  The  argument  for  keeping 
banks afloat is that a quick restructuring would 
curtail the availability of credit and be bad for 
growth.  But  against  these  short  run 
considerations  one  has  to  keep  in  mind  that 
banks with too little capital, or those without a 
viable business model, tend to keep extending 
credit  to  their  existing  customers  even  if  their 
creditworthiness is low, and to restrict lending 
to new companies or projects. This misallocation 
of  capital  hampers  any  recovery  and  reduces 
longer  terms  growth  prospects.  Others  have 
referred to this situation as ‘zombie banks’. 
The one country where this long run effect can 
be  seen  most  clearly  is  Italy  (see  Gros  2011). 
                                                   
2 It is now official policy to ‘bail in’ bank creditors. But the 
new rules on inflicting losses on creditors of failing banks 
will enter into force only in 2018. 
Italian  banks  have  over  the  last  decade 
continued  to  lend  to  domestic  enterprises, 
especially SMEs while GDP has not grown. The 
productivity of investment in Italy has thus been 
close to zero, even before the crisis. The crisis, 
with  the  ensuring  fall  in  GDP  has  of  course 
exacerbated this trend and has exposed the low 
returns on investment as many SMEs are failing, 
creating  large  losses  for  the  banks.  In  other 
words, the real problem might not be too little 
credit  but  its  allocation:  credit  flowing  to  the 
wrong enterprises and sectors and not flowing 
where  is  more  productive.  Just  re-capitalising 
banks will not change this underlying problem.  
Italy  represents  an  extreme  case  of  a  low 
productivity of investment, but it is evident that 
there  were  important  other  cases  of  mis-
allocation  of  capital  in  many  other  countries 
(e.g. in the housing sector in Spain and Ireland, 
US subprime securities by German banks). The 
problem  for  Europe  might  thus  appear  in  the 
short run to keep credit flowing, but the more 
important problem in the long run is to change 
the  allocation  of  capital.  This  will  not  be 
achieved if all failing banks are just kept afloat 
by re-capitalisation. 
Conclusion 
The  raw  numbers  are  stark:  The  130  banks 
under  the  direct  supervision  of  the  ECB  and 
now under review have about €25,000 billion of 
assets  and  only  about  €1,000  billion  of  capital 
(about 4% of assets). This is a highly leveraged, 
and thus potentially unstable, sector. Any losses 
uncovered  by  the  AQR  can  at  most  remedy 
immediate  needs  for  more  capital  at  some 
problematic  banks,  but  cannot  change  the 
chronic undercapitalisation of the entire sector. 
Hundreds  of  billions  would  be  needed  to 
strengthen the entire sector. 
Moreover, the set of so-called ‘SSM banks’ has 
in the aggregate not made any profit since 2008. 
This  seems  to  be  a  sector  that  has  consumed 
capital  for  years.  This  implies  that  a  re-
capitalisation per se cannot change the chronic 
capital shortage of this sector. 
This note argues that the market for bank capital 
is  working,  and  open  for  banks  with  a  viable 
business model. Hence, a priori, there is no case THE ASSET QUALITY REVIEW AND CAPITAL NEEDS: WHY RE-CAPITALISE BANKS WITH PUBLIC MONEY? | 7 
 
 
for  a  public  sector  re-capitalisation  of  weak 
banks. During a generalised banking crisis, one 
could  argue  that  markets  cannot  provide 
sufficient capital for troubled banks. However, 
this  is  no  longer  the  case.  Banks  that  are  still 
found  to  be  insufficiently  capitalised  after  a 
year-long process during which they had ample 
opportunity  to  go  to  the  market  should  be 
closed down or taken over. 
The  present  owner  will  oppose  any  re-
capitalisation  exactly  when  it  is  most  needed 
because a re-capitalisation need is only likely to 
emerge for banks with problems, i.e. banks for 
which capital will be naturally very expensive. 
But  under  these  circumstances,  any  re-
capitalisation via the capital market will dilute 
the control rights of the present owners.  
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